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When Life Gives You Lemons, Make A Lemon Law: North
Carolina Adopts Automobile Warranty Legislation
Most people know someone who knows someone who has bought a new car
that turned out to be a "lemon." Horror stories abound of leaks that refuse to
be plugged, cars that shake like vibrating beds, and other undiagnosed
problems.' The North Carolina Attorney General's Office reported in 1986 that
it received 1,155 written consumer complaints about new cars, most of which
involved a manufacturer's inability to repair the motor vehicle so it would con2
form with express warranties.
The problem of nonconformity of new vehicles with express warranties predates the enactment of state lemon laws. Before the lemon laws, the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC),3 the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 4 and certain
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 5 regulations provided remedies. North Carolina's latest addition to protection of new car buyers is its "Act To Provide Remedies for Consumers of New Motor Vehicles That Do Not Conform To Express
Warranties."'6 North Carolina has become the forty-second state to enact such a
'7
"lemon law."
1. Law review commentary on the subject also abounds. Alexopoulos, A New Twist for Texas
"'Lemon" Owners, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 155 (1985); Coffinberger & Samuels, Legislative Responses to
the Plight of New Car Purchasers, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 168 (1985); Goldberg, New Mexico's "Lemon
Law" ConsumerProtectionor ConsumerFrustration?,16 N.M.L. REv. 251 (1986); Honigman, The
New "Lemon Laws" Expanding U.CC Remedies, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 116 (1984); Kegley & Hiller,
"Emerging" Lemon CarLaws, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 87 (1986); Sklaw, The New Jersey Lemon Law: A
Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 137 (1985); Swanson, A1Comparative
Analysis of Three Lemon Laws, 75 ILL. B.J. 436 (1987); Tiede, Missouri's "Lemon Law" vs. the
U..C.C s Right of Revocation, 41 J. Mo. B. 449 (1985); Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws,
Consumer Warranties, and a Proposalfor Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589; Comment, "Lemon
Laws"in Ohio Turn Sourfor the Dealer, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 609 (1984); Note, LB. 155: Nebraska's
"Lemon Law":" Synthesizing Remedies for the Owner of a "Lemon", 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 345
(1984) [hereinafter Note, Nebraska's "Lemon Law"]; Note, A Sour Note: A Look At The Minnesota
Lemon Law, 68 MINN. L.REV. 846 (1984) [hereinafter Note, A Sour Note]; Note, Virginia'sLemon
Law: The Best Treatmentfor a Car Owner's Canker, 19 U. RICH. L. REv.405 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Virginia'sLemon Law]; Note, Lemon Laws: Putting the Squeeze on Automobile Manufacturers, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1125 (1984).
2. Raleigh News & Observer, May 27, 1987, at Cl, col. 4.
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-2-101 to -725 (1987).
4. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub, L, No.
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982)).
5. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433, 703 (1987).
6. Act of June 16, 1987, ch. 385, §§ 20-351 to -351.10, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 177, 177-79
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-351 to -351.10 (1987) (effective October 1, 1987)).
7. The North Carolina statute's predecessors include: ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.45.240-.360
(1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1261 to -1265 (Supp. 1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2 (West
Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 42-12-101 to -107 (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42-179 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 5001-5009 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 681.10-.111 (West Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:2-313.1 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 121 1/2, para. 1201-1208 (Smith-Hurd Sipp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322E.1 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-645 to -646 (1986 Cum. Supp.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 367.840-.846 (1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1941-1948 (West Cum. Supp. 1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1161-1167 (Supp. 1987); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-1501 (Supp.
1987); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 7N 1/2 (Law. Co-op. 1987); MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 9.2705(1) to (10) (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665 (West Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 63-17-151 to -165 (Cum. Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.560-.579 (Vernon Supp.
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The forty-two lemon laws enacted thus far vary, but one can draw a composite. A "typical" lemon law sets out a statutory term during which a con-

sumer must notify the manufacturer that her motor vehicle does not conform to
express warranties. The nonconformity must substantially impair the use or
value of the motor vehicle. A nonconformity is presumed to exist if the purchaser has to return the vehicle for repairs a certain number of times, or the

vehicle spends a certain number of days in the shop during the statutory term.
If a manufacturer cannot correct the nonconformity within a reasonable time, it
must either replace the vehicle or refund the purchase price, less an allowance
for the consumer's use. A consumer may be entitled to collateral damages such

as registration fees and taxes, as well as incidental and consequential damages.
Many lemon laws provide for attorney's fees. A consumer cannot invoke the

lemon law until she has made use of the manufacturer's government-approved
arbitration procedures. Statutes of limitation range from six months to four
years. A violation of the lemon law may also qualify as a violation of state
unfair trade laws.
This Note describes the protections available to new car purchasers in

North Carolina before the legislature enacted the lemon law. It then compares
North Carolina's lemon law to those of other states to determine how well the

statute has avoided criticisms of lemon laws in other jurisdictions. The Note
concludes that the North Carolina lemon law has succeeded in correcting sev-

eral of these problems. However, the North Carolina lemon law does not add as
much to consumer protection as car buyers might hope.
Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in 1975 to establish
rules governing the contents of written warranties.8 The rights the Act gives to

a consumer under a "full" warranty are substantial. 9 A full warranty must provide for correction of a defect or malfunction within a reasonable period of

time. 10 If a manufacturer cannot cure the defect after a reasonable number of

attempts, the consumer may choose to receive a full refund or replacement of
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-501 to -507 (1983); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 60-2701 to - 2709
(1984); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 598.751-.791 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 357D:1-:8 (1984 &
Cum. Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-19 to -28 (West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 5716A-1 to -9 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 51-07-16 to -22 (Cum. Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901 (West Supp. 1988);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.315-.375 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1951-1963 (Purdon Supp. 1987);
R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 31-5.2-1 to -13 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-24-201 to -211 (Supp.
1987); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 13-20-1 to -7 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4170-4181 (1984 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 59.1-207.9 to .14 (1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.118.010-.070 (Supp. 1987); W. VA.
CODE §§ 46A-6A-1 to -9 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.015 (West Supp. 1987); WYo. STAT. § 4017-101 (Supp. 1987).
8. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982)). For more
complete summaries of the Magnuson-Moss Act and its role in protecting new car purchasers, see
Coffinberger & Samuels, supra note 1, at 170-73; Goldberg, supra note 1, at 260-63; Kegley & Hiller,
supra note 1, at 89-91; Vogel, supra note 1, at 610-15; Note, A Sour Note, supra note 1, at 855; Note,

Virginia'sLemon Law, supra note 1, at 412-13.
9. See Coffinberger & Samuels, supra note 1, at 170-71.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (1982).
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the product.11 These provisions seem to offer consumers protection. However,
because the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act apply to full warranties and
most automobile warranties are limited warranties, the Act has been of little
12
assistance to new car purchasers.
Federal Trade Commission protection of new car purchasers is also limited,
because the Commission does not have the resources to resolve individual car
warranty disputes. 13 Instead, the FTC has established rules for manufacturer
arbitration procedures pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Act-rules which most
state lemon laws require manufacturers to follow. 14 Aside from rules concerning arbitration, one significant FTC regulation allows the purchaser of a new car
to assert all claims or defenses she would have against a seller, or against a
lender to whom she was referred by the seller.15 Thus, if a consumer stops paying installments to a lender because of a seller's breach of warranty, she has a
16
defense whether her loan was financed by a dealer or by a bank.
The Magnuson-Moss Act and FTC regulations protected consumers to
some extent prior to the enactment of lemon laws, but the most substantial protection for new car purchasers came from the Uniform Commercial Code. The
UCC provides three possible courses of action for lemon buyers. 17 A consumer
may reject the automobile,18 sue for damages for breach of warranty, 19 or revoke acceptance. 20 North Carolina consumers have not used section 2-602 to
any significant extent, because a buyer generally forfeits her right to reject when
she accepts the automobile. 2 1 Although consumers have utilized breach of warranty and revocation provisions, the cases are surprisingly few. 22
11. Id. § 2304(a)(4). The Act does not define "reasonable number of attempts," leaving it up to
the F.T.C. to promulgate regulations. Id.
12. See Coffinberger & Samuels, supranote 1,at 172; Goldberg, supra note 1, at 251-52; see also
Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss.4ct Upon Consumer Product Warranties,55 N.C.L. REV. 835
(1977) (Magnuson-Moss Act has failed to fulfill its objectives); Strasser, Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act: An Overview and Comparison With UCC Coverage,Disclaimerand Remedies in Consumer Warranties,27 MERCER L. Rnv. 1111 (1976) (Magnuson-Moss Act will protect consumers in most sales
of goods but it will create problems when its coverage is not identical to UCC coverage).
13. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a practice commentary (McKinney Supp. 1988).
14. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)(8), 2310(a) (1982); 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1986) (Informal Dispute
Resolution Procedures).
15. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1987). This regulation is discussed in Smith, Preserving Consumers'
Claims and Defenses, 63 A.B.A. J. 1401 (1977).
16. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a).
17. Almost all the commentaries on lemon laws contain a discussion of UCC protection. See
Goldberg, supra note 1,at 254-59; Honigman, supra note 1, at 118-24; Sklaw, supra note 1, at 14556; Vogel, supra note 1, at 593-610; Note, Virginia'sLemon Law, supra note 1, at 408-12.
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-602 (1986).
19. See id. § 25-2-714.
20. See id. § 25-2-608. Consumers may proceed under both breach of warranty and revocation
theories simultaneously. Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 395-96, 186 S.E.2d 161,
167 (1972).
21. See Note, .4 Sour Lemon, supra note 1, at 848-49; see also Vogel, supra note 1, at 606
(exclusive repair and replacement clause also prevents buyer from rejecting or revoking acceptance
of defective auto).
22. The low number of suits may result from the expense of lengthy litigation, the availability
of informal dispute resolution procedures, or willingness by dealers to appease consumers in order to
maintain good customer relations.
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If a consumer prevails in a suit for breach of express or implied warranty
under the UCC, she may recover the difference between the value of the goods
accepted and their value as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damage of a different amount.2 3 The difficulty for new car buyers is that
most automobile manufacturers limit their express warranties to repair or replacement of parts. 24 A consumer conceivably could return her car several
times for repair of essentially the same defect, and the manufacturer would not
be in breach of its express warranty so long as it repeatedly replaced the defective part.2 5 If this happens, the consumer can either sue for breach of implied
warranties or show that the express limited warranty has "failed of its essential
purpose,"' 26 in which case the consumer may invoke other UCC remedies,
namely revocation of acceptance. 27
North Carolina car buyers have had some success in proving that a warranty fails of its essential purpose, although the case law is sparse. In Stutts v.
Green Ford,Inc. 28 the North Carolina Court of Appeals found a directed verdict
for the manufacturer improper when the manufacturer's repeated failure to correct an oil leak in plaintiff's truck caused an express limited warranty to fail of
its essential purpose. 29 Plaintiff was not required to give the manufacturer an
unlimited number of opportunities to cure the defect. 30 Significantly, the court
upheld a provision in the warranty that precluded recovery of consequential
damages.3 1 In another case, plaintiff returned his automobile to the dealer one
day after the purchase and six to eight more times before it was finally fixed two
years later. The court of appeals never reached the issue of failure of essential
purpose, ruling instead that the manufacturer had not effectively disclaimed im32
plied warranties.
To revoke acceptance under the UCC and thereby recover the purchase
price plus incidental and consequential damages, a consumer must prove that
defects in her automobile "substantially impair" the car's value to the consumer.3 3 Because automobiles manifest their defects in so many ways, no clear
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-714(2) (1986).
24. Senator Metzenbaum has said that 99% of all new car warranties are limited warranties,
but this may have been a rhetorical statistic. See Coffinberger & Samuels, supranote 1, at 172 (citing
125 CONG. REC. S11691 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1979)).
25. This problem was noted in Vogel, supra note 1, at 591; Note, Nebraska's "Lemon Law",
supra note 1, at 353-54. See also Tadlock v. Snipes Motors, Inc., 34 N.C. App. 557, 239 S.E.2d 311
(1977) (consumer forfeited action against manufacturer by not attacking the validity of the warranty
and not specifying a particular defective part).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-719(2) (1986).
27. Id. § 25-2-608.
28. 47 N.C. App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 919 (1980).
29. Id. at 511-12, 267 S.E.2d at 924-25.
30. Id. at 512, 267 S.E.2d at 924.
31. Id. at 515-16, 267 S.E.2d at 926 (such provisions to be upheld unless unconscionable).
32. Williams v. Hyatt Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 308, 316-17, 269 S.E.2d 184, 189,
cert. denied, 301 N.C. 406, 273 S.E.2d 451 (1980).
33. The North Carolina lemon law has adopted this subjective standard. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-351.3 (1987). The state courts will probably use UCC case law to interpret the language of the
lemon law. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 271; Honigman, supra note 1, at 123.
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factual test can be formulated to determine substantial impairment.3 4 However,
in Wright v. O'Neal Motors, Inc. 35 the North Carolina Court of Appeals established a test that took into account the consumer's subjective needs and reactions3 6 and the objective market value, reliability, safety, and usefulness of the
vehicle as it is generally used. 37 For purposes of summary judgment the court in
Wright did not explore the subjective effect of the alleged nonconforities on
plaintiff Wright. 3 8 However, the court of appeals was able to determine that
reasonable minds could differ on facts concerning the objective effect. Thus
where doubt existed as to whether defendant's salesman had orally guaranteed
the car's gas mileage, 39 and as to the impairment in value caused by the car's
twelve-day visit to defendant's garage, 4° the trial court erred in granting sum41
mary judgment.
In earlier UCC cases, courts never reached the issue of substantial impairment because the Code provided a cause of action against a seller only; any
action against a manufacturer was barred by lack of privity.4 2 The North Carolina General Assembly abolished the privity requirement when it expanded the
UCC definition of "seller" to include manufacturers. 4 3 Commentators have
cited the need to circumvent privity requirements as a rationale for lemon laws
in some states. 44 In North Carolina, where privity is not an issue, other rationales support enactment of the lemon law.
In addition to proving substantial impairment, a consumer who wants to
revoke acceptance must show that she is revoking within a reasonable time after
she discovered or should have discovered the problems with her automobile. 45
The UCC establishes no definition of a "reasonable time," which necessarily
varies according to the nature of the defect. In a North Carolina case in which
plaintiff drove his new car thirty thousand miles in seventeen months and then
sought to revoke after he had wrecked it, the court of appeals indicated he had
not revoked acceptance within a reasonable time. 4 6 The court also stated that
plaintiff had waived his right to revoke when he ratified the sale by continuing to
34. Note, A Sour Note, supra note 1, at 850.
35. 57 N.C. App. 49, 291 S.E.2d 165, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 393, 294 S.E.2d 221 (1982).
36. Id. at 51-52, 291 S.E.2d at 167.
37. Id. at 52, 291 S.E.2d at 167.
38. Id. at 54, 291 S.E.2d at 168.
39. Id. at 55, 291 S.E.2d at 168.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 56, 291 S.E.2d at 169.
42. See Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. App. 472, 474, 188 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1972); see also Kinlaw
v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 298 N.C. 494, 497-500, 259 S.E.2d 552, 554-57 (1979) (discussing the
history of privity in North Carolina law).
43. Act of June 23, 1983, ch. 598, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 529, 529 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-2-103(1)(d) (1986)).
44. See Kegley & Hiller, supra note 1, at 96; Vogel, supra note 1, at 622; Note, A Sour Note,
supra note 1, at 862.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-608(2) (1986). Most courts agree that the time during which a
consumer waits for a seller to make promised repairs should not count against her. Note, A Sour
Note, supra note 1, at 850-51 n.20.
46. Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. App. 472, 474, 188 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1972).
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use the car after discovery of the defect. 47
Another barrier to recovery under the UCC in North Carolina has been
failure by the consumer to give adequate notice of revocation to the manufacturer.4 8 In Poole v. Marion Buick Co., 49 for example, plaintiff's automobile experienced leaks and other defects within an eighteen-month period. The court of
appeals held that leaving the car at the dealership was insufficient to constitute
notice of revocation, which had to be" 'clear and unambiguous.' "50 The UCC,
however, does not require written notice. 5 1
The disparity between the number of formal complaints about new cars and
the number of suits finally brought under the UCC indicates that the Code has
not succeeded in protecting new car purchasers in North Carolina.5 2 The ambiguity of such terms as "substantial impairment" and "reasonable time" makes
litigation more likely and more lengthy.5 3 The uncertainty of outcome and the
fact that recovery will not include attorney fees may make lawyers reluctant to
take automobile warranty cases. 54 Delay and expense may eventually cause the
55
consumer simply to abandon a claim.
The remedies of the UCC, Magnuson-Moss Act, and FTC regulations protect purchases of many consumer goods, but these remedies are inadequate in
the context of the sale of new automobiles. The North Carolina General Assembly has enacted the lemon law to address problems specific to new motor vehicle
purchases. Like other similar laws, the purpose of the lemon law is to provide
objective guidelines for defining ambiguous terms, to encourage informal settlements, and thereby to further the UCC's objective of minimizing losses by encouraging parties to resolve their differences themselves. 56 To determine
whether the North Carolina law accomplishes these objectives, one must analyze
the statute.
The North Carolina statute is broader than many others in its definitions of
"consumer" and "motor vehicle."' 57 "Consumer" includes lessees as well as
47. Id. Other states have allowed consumers to continue using their cars, thereby recognizing
that most people cannot afford being without a vehicle. Honigman, supra note 1, at 122 & n.37.
48. "[Revocation] is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-2-608(2) (1986).
49. 14 N.C. App. 721, 189 S.E.2d 650 (1972).
50. Id. at 725, 189 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting 45 AM. JUR. Sales § 763 (1945)). The lemon law
requires a consumer to notify a manufacturer directly in writing before she can invoke the replace or
refund remedy. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.5(a) (1987).
51. In this respect the UCC is less demanding than the lemon law, which requires direct written
notice to the manufacturer before a consumer may invoke the law. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.5

(1987). See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
52. The Attorney General's office reported 1,155 complaints in 1986. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text. In contrast, the low number of reported court cases reflects purchasers who
resort to arbitration and purchasers who are appeased by dealers anxious to preserve good will.
53. See Honigman, supra note 1, at 124 n.43 (UCC litigation generally takes from two to seven
years).
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Kegley & Hiller, supra note 1, at 102.
Eddy, supra note 12, at 869-70.
See Honigman, supra note 1, at 125.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.1(1), (3) (1987).
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purchasers5 8 and "any other person entitled by the terms of an express warranty

to enforce the obligations of that warranty.

' 59

"Motor vehicle" incorporates the

broad definition in the motor vehicle code, to include "every vehicle which is

self-propelled and every vehicle designed to run upon the highway which is pulled by a self-propelled vehicle." 6 Owners of warranted vehicles that are not
61
covered by the lemon law must still resort to the UCC.

North Carolina's lemon law not only reinforces manufacturer warranties,
but also requires that they remain in effect at least one year or twelve thousand

miles. 62 The law's protection lasts up to two years or twenty-four thousand
miles if the warranty covers that period. 63 Most states require customers to
report defects in their new automobiles within one year or the period of the
warranty, whichever is earlier. 64 The original draft of the North Carolina bill
followed the majority of states by requiring the consumer to report defects
within one year or the warranty term, whichever was earlier. 65 Commentators

in other states have criticized the "earlier" language for not giving the consumer
enough time to establish that her car is a lemon. 66 Perhaps in response to this
58. Id. § 20-351.1(1). Other statutes that cover lessees include LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:1941(2)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(a) (West Supp. 1988);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-24-201(l)
(Supp. 1987).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.1(1) (1987). Presumably, this provision would cover donees and
subsequent purchasers during the statutory warranty period, which the law defines as the greater of
one year or the term of an express warranty of no more than two years or 24,000 miles. See id.
§§ 20-351.2, 20-351.3. A few statutes cover the original purchaser only. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121 1/2, para. 1202(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-645(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(33) (1983). The definition excludes mopeds, as most lemon
laws do. Id. But see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.118.020(1) (Supp. 1987) (definition includes
moped). The North Carolina lemon law does cover motorcycles. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.1(3)
(1987). The New Jersey and New Hampshire statutes include motorcycles. See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 357-D:1 II(c) (Cum. Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-19(a) (West Supp. 1986).
61. Purchasers of house trailers, mopeds, and vehicles weighing more than 10,000 pounds cannot make use of North Carolina's lemon law. It would appear the law does not apply to boats either,
because they do not run "upon the highway." However, the statute is broad enough to cover tractors and other farm vehicles, which were excluded in the original draft of the bill. See Review Draft
§ 20-351.1(3) (April 3, 1987).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.2 (1987). In theory, this provision imposes warranty obligations on manufacturers who would otherwise provide coverage for less than a year. In practice,
however, almost all manufacturers warrant their cars for at least a year to attract customers.
63. Id. § 20-351.3 (1987). This provision and others are explained in laypersons' terms in Raleigh News & Observer, May 27, 1987, at Cl, col. 3.
64. Variations include VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.12 (1987) and Wyo. STAT. § 40-17-101(b)
(Supp. 1987) (one year following date of original delivery); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para.
1202(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987), Ky. REv. STAT. § 367.842(1) (1987), and OR. REV. STAT.
§ 646.325(2) (1985) (earlier of one year or 12,000 miles); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 7N 1/2(1)
(Law Co-op. 1987) and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.2-1(F) (Supp. 1987) (earlier of one year or 15,000
miles); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1954(a) (Purdon Supp. 1987) (earlier of one year, warranty term, or
12,000 miles); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-501(6) (1983) and N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (earlier of two years or 18,000 miles); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1163(1)(B) (Supp. 1987) (earlier of two years, 18,000 miles, or warranty term); MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. §§ 14-1501(g)(1), -1502(b) (Supp. 1987) (earlier of 15 months or 15,000 miles); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 490:2-313(a) (1985) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4172(c) (1984) (term of warranty).
The law does not address the issue of currently popular extended warranties, which often contain a
deductable. Clifford, All You Need to Know About The North CarolinaLemon Law, N.C. B. Notes
(Feb/Mar. 1988) (part one).
65. See Review Draft § 20-351.2(a) (April 3, 1987).
66. In North Carolina, a car is not presumed to be a lemon until it has undergone repair at-
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criticism, the North Carolina law as passed allows the consumer to report the
defect within a year or the term of the warranty, whichever is greater. 67 Because
the durations of most automobile warranties are at least one year, the provision
may add little to existing protection.
With its provision that a consumer must report a defect within the greater
of one year or the warranty term, a further question is whether this period includes a mileage limitation as well as a time limitation. Suppose a traveling
salesperson buys a new car with a one-year, twelve-thousand-mile warranty.
She then drives the car sixty thousand miles in ten months before discovering
and reporting a series of nonconformities. Would a court view the statutory
one-year period under the lemon law as "greater" (less restrictive) than the oneyear, twelve-thousand-mile term of the manufacturer's warranty, and so hold
the manufacturer liable for a defect occurring after the consumer has driven five
times the mileage provided in the warranty? Other states have eliminated this
ambiguity by incorporating mileage limitations into their statutory terms of
68
protection.
A separate section of the North Carolina lemon law states that the statute
only covers defects that occur "no later than 24 months or 24,000 miles following original delivery."' 69 The general assembly evidently intended this provision
to protect manufacturers from the law's replacement or refund remedies when
the warranties in question are for longer terms, such as five years or fifty thousand miles. 70 However, it is unclear whether the twenty-four thousand mile cap
would apply to a case such as the one described above, in which the car is warranted for less than two years or twenty-four thousand miles, but a consumer
who has driven several thousand extra miles is given the "greater" statutory
period of one year in which to report a defect.
A critical provision of the lemon law is its replacement or refund provision.7 1 Like similar provisions in other lemon laws, it borrows language from
tempts for the same defect or series of defects, or has spent a total of 20 business days in the shop
within the statutory period. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.5(a)(l)-(2) (1987). For criticism of the "earlier" language, see Goldberg, supra note 1, at 267; Note, A Sour Lemon, supra note 1, at 867.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.2 (1987). West Virginia is the only other state to take the
greater of the two time periods. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-6A-3(a) (1986). The UCC requires only
that notice of a defect be given "within a reasonable time." N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-2-607(3)(a),
-608(2) (1986), which might be either less than or greater than one year or the warranty period.
Commentators have criticized lemon laws because their notice requirements may bar recovery if a
consumer discovers a defect within the warranty period, but does not report it until shortly after the
warranty has expired. See Vogel, supra note 1, at 623-24.
68. See supra note 64.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.3 (1987).
70. "Under the bill, manufacturers and dealers would get four chances to repair a recurring
problem with a vehicle that has up to a 24 month or 24,000 mile warranty." Raleigh News &
Observer, May 27, 1987, at Cl, col. 4. This article quoted the sponsor of the bill as stating, "If you
have a lemon you are going to know it before 24 months." Id. at Cl, col. 5 (quoting Rep. Charles M.
Beale, D-Haywood).
71. The statute provides:
If the manufacturer is unable, after a reasonable number of attempts, to conform the motor
vehicle to any express warranty by repairing or correcting. . . any defect or condition or
series of defects or conditions which substantially impair the value of the motor vehicle to
the consumer, and which occurred no later than 24 months or 24,000 miles following origi-
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the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act to allow replacement or refund if a manufacturer cannot repair a defect after a reasonable number of attempts. 72 The lemon
law provides a presumption that a reasonable number of attempts have been
made if the manufacturer has attempted to repair a nonconformity four times, or

the vehicle is in the shop for a cumulative total of twenty business days during
any twelve-month period of the warranty. 73 Most states presume that four re-

pair attempts or thirty calendar or business days in the shop during the statutory
period constitutes a reasonable number of repair attempts; however, figures

range from three repairs or fifteen business days 74 to four repairs or forty-five
calendar days.75 Therefore, North Carolina's statutory presumption allows a

consumer to invoke the lemon law sooner than she could in many other states.
Further, North Carolina does not require, as some states do, that more than one
of the four repair attempts be made by the same dealer. 76 The presumption
provides more certainty than the UCC, which does not specify how long or how

many attempts a seller must make to cure a defect before a warranty fails of its
essential purpose.

77

The North Carolina lemon law is typical in that the statutory presumption
that a reasonable number of repair attempts have been made will not apply unless the consumer notifies the manufacturer directly in writing of the existence of
a nonconformity and allows the manufacturer one last chance to cure the defect. 78 A virtue of the statute is that it sets a time limit in which a manufacturer
may make that last attempt to cure.79 On the other hand, a consumer who has
already returned her car for repairs four times or gone without the car for
twenty business days will not want to go without it for another fifteen days while
the manufacturer tries once again to fix the problem.8 0 The UCC does not renal delivery of the vehicle,

the manufacturer shall, at the option of the consumer, replace
the vehicle with a comparable new motor vehicle or accept return of the vehicle from the
consumer and [provide a] refund.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.3 (1987).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1982), supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.5(a) (1987). A presumption serves only to allocate the burden
of proof and can be rebutted. Only one state provides a definition of "reasonable number of attempts" rather than a presumption. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 218.015(l)(n) (West Supp. 1987).
Some state statutes trigger the presumption after only one attempt to repair if the defect involves a
safety feature such as brakes or steering. See, eg., MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-1502(d)(3)
(Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665 Subd. 3(c) (West Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 46A6A-5(b) (1986).
74. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(3)(a) (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-159(3)(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1987).
75. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901D (West Supp. 1988).
76. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1163(3)(a) (Supp. 1987) (two out of four times to the
same dealer); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4172(h) (1984 & Supp. 1987) (all three times to same dealer,
unless there is a good reason to do otherwise).
77. Vogel, supra note 1, at 630.
78. Notice to the manufacturer is only required if the manufacturer has previously informed
the consumer of the requirement. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.5(a) (1987). North Carolina law gives
the manufacturer a maximum of 15 days to cure the nonconformity. Id.
79. Some other states leave the length of time unspecified. See, eg., OR. REv. STAT.
§ 646.345(4) (1985); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6A-5(c) (1986); Wyo. STAT. § 40-17-101(h) (Supp. 1987).
80. Giving the manufacturer fewer days in which to make a last attempt to cure the defect
might be more reasonable. See MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 9.2705(3)(b) (Supp. 1987) (five days);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.2-5 (Supp. 1987) (one week).
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quire a consumer to give a manufacturer an opportunity to cure before she can
revoke acceptance, 8 1 and a few states do not make it a condition of their lemon
82
law remedies.
Some commentators have criticized direct notice requirements such as the
one in the North Carolina lemon law. These commentators argue that because
dealers must report all repairs under warranty to manufacturers anyway, dealer
reports should serve as notice to the manufacturer.8 3 Some states appear to
allow this form of notice by providing for notice made "by or on behalf of" the
consumer.84 One state expressly places the burden of notifying the manufacturer on the dealer. 85 The direct notice requirement, although it may be a problem for consumers, is not necessarily unreasonable. Although manufacturers
receive records of warranty repairs made by dealers, it would be burdensome for
manufacturers to compile records of each customer's repairs to determine when
a reasonable number of attempts have been made. North Carolina's notice requirement is not as strict as those of some other states, 86 but both its notice
requirement and its requirement of opportunity to cure are more strict than the
87

provisions of the UCC.

Lemon laws generally require a manufacturer to repair or correct any "defect" or "nonconformity" in a new motor vehicle.88 If a manufacturer has four
attempts to repair each defect, a consumer might have her car repaired a dozen
times, but be unable to invoke the lemon law before statutory protection expires
because no four of the repairs have been made to the same part.8 9 Some states
avoid this problem by specifically defining "nonconformity." 90 Other state statutes refer to repairing a "condition," which courts can interpret'more broadly
81. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-608 (1986).
82. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-D:3 (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-20-5 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.118.050 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 218.015(2)(6) (West Supp. 1987).

83. Vogel, supra note 1, at 624, 646 ("Consumers rarely know about notice requirements and
often fail to comply with them.").
84. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16A-3(C.)(2) (Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-19(3)
(Cum. Supp. 1987).
85. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-D:2 (1984).
86. Some states require written notice by certified mail. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 9.2705(3)(a) (Supp. 1987) (by return receipt service); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-2704 (1984); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 55-24-205(2)(c) (Supp. 1987).
87. See Vogel, supra note 1, at 592. For a discussion of notice problems under the UCC, see
supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.320 (1986); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36),
§ 6.07(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.118.050 (Supp. 1987) (nonconformity); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6A-5(a) (1986) (nonconformity).
89. This problem is pointed out in Goldberg, supra note 1, at 270; Vogel, supra note 1, at 63031.
90. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1941(7) (West Cum. Slipp. 1987) (any specific or generic defect or malfunction); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 90, § 7N 1/2(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (any
specific or generic defect or malfunction, or any concurrent combination of such defects or malfunctions); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.2-1(E) (Supp. 1987) (any specific or generic defect or malfunction, or
any concurrent combination of such defects or malfunctions); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.015(l)(f)
(West Supp. 1987) (condition or defect).
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'Still other state legislatures have phrased their presumptions

of a "reasonable number of attempts" to place a cap on the total number of
repair attempts a manufacturer may make.92 North Carolina provides for repair

of a defect or condition, or for "a series of defects or conditions,

'93

which

should avoid the situation of a dozen repairs made to various parts.

Lemon laws require a nonconformity to impair substantially the use or

value of the motor vehicle,94 or to impair substantially its use or value to the
consumer.95 North Carolina takes the latter, subjective approach, which parallels the language of the UCC. 96 The North Carolina lemon law requires the

nonconformity to "substantially impair the value of the motor vehicle to the
consumer." 97 This borrowing of UCC language should allow courts to use UCC
case law to interpret the lemon law.98 Because the lemon law does not clarify
what constitutes substantial impairment to the consumer, North Carolina courts
will likely apply the combined subjective-objective test of substantial impairment
set forth in Wright.99
By not defining substantial impairment more specifically under the lemon
law, the general assembly has missed an opportunity to supplement UCC protection. Under either statute, the ambiguity may work against the consumer by
encouraging litigation. 100
North Carolina consumers are fortunate that the lemon law gives the consumer the option to elect a refund or a replacement, rather than allowing the
manufacturer to choose.10 ' Most state legislatures have provoked uncertainty
91. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1163(2) (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.567(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-20-4 (1986).
92. See, eg., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-645(d) (Cum. Supp. 1986) (four attempts at one nonconformity or ten attempts at any nonconformity); MD.,COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-1502(d)(2) (Supp.
1987) (vehicle out of service for repair of one or more nonconformities, defects or conditions for a
cumulative total of 30 or more days).
93. The language "series of defects or conditions" was not in the original draft of the lemon
law. See Review Draft (April 3, 1987).
94. See, eg., COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-12-103(1) (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1986) (substantially impair use and market value); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1941(7) (West Cum. Supp. 1987) (substantially impair use or market value); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.13 (1987) (replacing "substantially"
with "significantly").
95. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-179(d) (West 1987); HAw. REV. STAT. § 490:2313.1(b) (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322E.1(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50645(d) (Cum. Supp. 1986). State statutes that consider use, value, orsafety include ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 121 1/2, para. 1202, § 2(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. § 367.841(6) (1987); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 218.015(1)(f) (West Supp. 1987).
96. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-608(2) (1986).
97. Id. § 20-351.3.
98. Similar interpretation would make sense, because lemon law claims may be coupled with
UCC claims. Honigman, supra note 1, at 123; see also Goldberg, supra note 1, at 271 (proposing use
of UCC case law on "substantial impairment" even when the lemon law does not include the subjective language "to the consumer").
99. 57 N.C. App. 49, 291 S.E.2d 165 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 36-41 (description of the test applied in Wright).
100. See Vogel, supra note 1, at 627 (uncertainty encourages litigation); Honigman, supranote 1,
at 124 n.43 (lengthy litigation of revocation of acceptance discourages litigation altogether).
101. Other states' statutes that give the option to the consumer include ALASKA STAT,
§ 45.45.305 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(2)(a) (West Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 367.842(2) (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(3)(a) (West Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN.
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by not delegating the decision to either the consumer or the manufacturer. 10 2 A
few states allow the manufacturer to decide, creating a danger that consumers
may be forced to accept a replacement vehicle in which they have no confidence,
from a manufacturer they no longer trust.10 3 The consumer's power to choose a
refund is imperative in North Carolina because the lemon law does not define
"comparable motor vehicle," and thus gives manufacturers significant discretion
in choosing a replacement vehicle.1° 4
If a consumer elects a refund she can recover the full contract price paid for
the vehicle, 10 5 collateral charges, 10 6 all finance charges incurred after she first
reports the nonconformity, 10 7 incidental damages, 10 8 and consequential damages.10 9 From this amount the factfinder must subtract "a reasonable allowance
for use" in an amount directly attributable to use by the consumer prior to her
first report of the nonconformity, and during any subsequent period when the

vehicle was not out of service because of repair. 110
If the North Carolina lemon law's setoff provision had turned on this am§ 63-17-159(1) (Cum. Supp. 1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1955 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.2-3 (Supp. 1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4172(e) (1984 & Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 218.015(2)(b) (West Supp.
1987).
102. See, e.g., ARMZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1263 (Supp. 1987); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 5003
(Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901 (West Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-24-203
(Supp. 1987); WYO. STAT. § 40-17-101 (Supp. 1987).
103. See, eg., COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-12-103(l) (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:1944A.(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1987) ("manufacturer shall.... or at its option"); MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 7N 1/2(3) (Law. Co-op. 1987) ("at the manufacturer's option"); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 9.2705(3)(1) (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.567(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987); see
also Goldberg, supra note 1, at 273 (when a manufacturer has provided a consumer with a seriously
defective automobile and has been unable to cure the defect after an extensive period in the shop, "it
would not be surprising if the consumer no longer had confidence in either the automobile or the
manufacturer"); Vogel, supranote 1, at 636 (the UCC does not require a buyer "to accept substitute
goods from a seller after revocation of acceptance," and a lemon law "should provide no less").
104. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.3 (1987).
105. The contract price includes, but is not limited to, charges for undercoating, dealer preparation and transport, installed options, and nonrefundable portions of extended warranties and service
contracts. Id. § 20-351.3(1).
106. Collateral charges include, but are not limited to, sales tax, license and registration fees, and
similar governmental charges. Id. 20-351.3(2).
107. Id. § 20-351.3(3).
108. Id. § 20-351.3(4). The lemon law does not define incidental damages, although the UCC in
its definition includes "expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care
and custody of goods," expenses of covering, and other reasonable expenses incident to breach. Id.
§ 25-2-715(1).
109. Id. § 20-351.3(4). The lemon law does not define consequential damages, which the UCC
defines as any loss resulting from general or particular needs of which the seller had knowledge at
the time of contracting, and injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty. Id. § 25-2-715(2)(a), (b). Thus, consequential damages would presumably include outof-pocket expenses such as towing fees, car rental, and hotel expenses. Goldberg, supra note 1, at
274. Some lemon law remedies are actually narrower than UCC remedies because they do not allow
recovery of consequential damages. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.102(5) (West Supp. 1987).
North Carolina cases have honored limits on consequential damages in manufacturer warranties,
even when the warranty has failed of its essential purpose. See Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C.
App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 919 (1980). Unless manufacturers are to be allowed to contract around the
lemon law, courts will now have to award consequential damages, an improvement over UCC remedies for breach of warranty.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.3(4) (1987). The UCC does not expressly require setoff, but
North Carolina cases have allowed setoff under § 25-2-714(2). See Williams v. Hyatt Chrysler
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biguous formula, it would have created uncertainty that might increase litigation.1 11 Instead, the general assembly adopted the formula of the Connecticut
lemon law, which creates a presumption that a "reasonable allowance for use"
equals the cash price of the vehicle multiplied by a fraction having as its denominator one hundred thousand miles and as its numerator the number of miles on
the vehicle attributable to the consumer.1 12 Under this formula, a consumer
who buys a ten thousand dollar automobile and reports a nonconformity after
driving it one thousand miles will be entitled to a full refund less one hundred
dollars. 113 The formula appears fair to the consumer and provides needed cer-

tainty. Unlike some lemon laws, the North Carolina statute also deducts a reasonable allowance for use only from a refund, and does not require a consumer
114
to pay the allowance out of pocket if she elects to have the car replaced.

Lemon law protection is not available to a consumer who has not first made
use of a manufacturer's informal settlement procedures, to the extent those procedures conform to FTC regulations promulgated under the Magnuson-Moss

Warranty Act.1 1 5 Arbitration provisions have provoked controversy in other

Plymouth, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 308, 318, 269 S.E.2d 184, 190 (1980) (burden on manufacturer to
show depreciation).
Ill. Comment, supra note 1, at 641. One commentator would prefer to determine setoff by
reference to UCC case law. See Vogel, supra note 1, at 640. In North Carolina, where there is little
case law on point, the formula the lemon law provides may be preferable.
112. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-179(d) (West 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.3(4)
(1987). Connecticut was the first state to enact a lemon law. Other state statutes to adopt Connecticut's formula include ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1161(4) (Supp. 1987) (added by amendment
two years after original enactment); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 7N 1/2(3) (Law. Co-op. 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-501(5) (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.2-3 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 4172(e) (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.015(2)(b) (West Supp. 1987) (award may not exceed
this amount). North Carolina is the only state to treat the formula as a presumption.
113. Other states have defined "reasonable use" as one-half of the amount allowed by § 162 of
the Internal Revenue Code, which currently allows twenty-one cents a mile for use. I.R.C. § 162
(1982). See, eg., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.13(2) (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-24-203(b)(4)(B)
(Supp. 1987). This amount would not change with the value of the automobile, which might be
unfair to manufacturers. Mississippi would allow twenty cents a mile for consumer use, also not
taking into account the value of the motor vehicle. MIss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-159(l) (Cum. Supp.
1987). The Kansas lemon law determines reasonable allowance by using the most recent edition of
the United States Department of Transportation's Cost of Owning and Operating Autos and Vans.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-645(c) (Cum. Supp. 1986). In New York mileage in excess of 12,000 miles is
multiplied by the purchase price, divided by 100,000 miles. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(4) (McKinney Supp. 1987). Reasonable allowance for use in three other states is the lesser often cents for
each mile driven or 10% of the purchase price of the vehicle. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 9.2705(3)(1) (Supp 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(3)(a) (West Supp. 1988); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 1955 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
114. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 5003(a)(1) (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.567(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.13(2) (1987).
115. "Nothing in this section shall prevent a manufacturer from requiring a consumer to utilize
an informal settlement procedure prior to litigation if that procedure substantially complies [with
federal regulations]." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.7 (1987). The original draft of the law included an
elaborate arbitration provision which required the Attorney General to evaluate, certify, and investigate all arbitration programs. See Review Draft § 20-351.9 (April 3, 1987). The arbitration panel
had a limited time to announce its decision, consumers did not have to make the car available to a
manufacturer's representative for inspection more than once, and the manufacturer had to loan the
consumer a car during the inspection. Id. Arbitrators were instructed to consider as damages all
remedies that would be available if the claim went to court. Id. The Attorney General's Office
preferred to use its resources directly, in litigation, and the drafting committee simplified the arbitration provision to its present form. See Letter from James C. Gulick, Special Deputy Attorney Gen-
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states. Proponents argue that arbitration saves money. 116 Opponents believe
arbitration presents procedural hurdles that work against the consumer. 1 17
Both arguments may be moot, because there is some indication that manufacturers are moving away from informal settlement procedures. 118
North Carolina is one of the few states whose lemon law specifically creates
a governmental cause of action by the Attorney General,' 1 9 as well as a private
cause of action by consumers.' 20 Faced with numerous consumer complaints
about new car warranties, the Attorney General was a major proponent of the
statute. 12 1 The high profile of the Attorney General's Office should help the
Office in publicizing the new law and informing consumers that legal remedies
exist. The governmental cause of action should also prove significant as a bargaining tool in negotiations between the Attorney General's Office and manufacturers.' 22 In this respect the lemon law represents an improvement over the
UCC, which provides no governmental cause of action.
The North Carolina lemon law allows discretionary attorney's fees to the
prevailing party upon a finding of bad faith by either the manufacturer or the
consumer. 123 Consumers would fare better if they could recover attorneys' fees
eral, to Susan Iddings, Legislative Services Office (April 13, 1987) (responding as requested to
provisions of the draft) (on file at NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW).
116. See, eg., Ervine, ProtectingNew CarPurchasers: Recent UnitedStates and English Developments Compared, 34 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 342, 350 (1985) (arbitration requirement "sensible");
Note, A Sour Note, supra note 1, at 873 (arbitration may encourage settlements and increase consumer success, and is less expensive); Note, Nebraska's "Lemon Law", supra note 1, at 375.
117. See, eg., Goldberg, supra note 1, at 276-77 (arbitration presents a procedural obstacle because the Magnuson-Moss Act states it cannot bind the other party); Platt, Lemon Auto Legislation
in Illinois, 73 ILL. B.J. 504, 508 (1985) ("Arbitration is an unsatisfactory remedy because of the
factfinding process. A complete record is not kept; the rules of evidence do not apply; discovery and
compulsory cross-examination do not exist and witnesses are seldom, if ever, placed under oath....
Furthermore, arbitrators are under no duty to state the reasons for their decision."); Sklaw, supra
note 1, at 157-58 (arbitration ineffective, because by that point consumer is hostile); Vogel, supra
note 1, at 648-60 (consumer will still pay attorney fees, decisions are often delayed, and "admission
of [a] decision into evidence could create an unfair hurdle for a consumer who received an unfavorable decision from the [resolution] mechanism"); Note, A Sour Note, supra note 1, at 875 (arbitrators
do not generally award consequential damages).
118. Letter, supra note 115. Chrysler and General Motors do not require arbitration, but Ford
does. Clifford, supra note 64, at n.9.
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.6 (1987).
120. Id. § 20-351.7. Florida amended its lemon law in 1985 to allow the Attorney General to
fine a manufacturer up to $1,000 for each noncompliance. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.110 (West Supp.
1987). Massachusetts also amended its law in 1985 to allow the Attorney General to bring an action. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N 1/2(8) (West Supp. 1987). Kentucky gives its Attorney
General the power to enforce the lemon law and collect the expenses of such enforcement from the
offending manufacturer. Ky. REv. STAT. § 367.845 (1987). Several states enlist their consumer
protection divisions by making violation of the lemon law constitute violation of state unfair and
deceptive trade practice laws. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1166 (Supp. 1987); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N 1/2(7) (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-533 (1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.2-13 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4177 (1984 & Supp. 1987).
121. The Attorney General's office would have liked a stronger law that would provide a cause
of action against dealers as well as manufacturers, but was thwarted by Senator Anthony E. Rand,
D-Cumberland. Raleigh News & Observer, June 10, 1987, at 8A, col. 1.
122. Interview with Donald Clifford, Aubrey L. Brooks Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina School of Law (September 29, 1987).
123. Attorneys' fees are awarded if "the manufacturer unreasonably failed or refused to fully
resolve the matter," or "the party instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was
frivolous or malicious." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.8(3) (1987).
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as a matter of course, as consumers may do in many other states, regardless of
whether the manufacturer has misbehaved. 1 24 Recovery of attorneys' fees under
the statute may make lawyers more willing to take automobile warranty cases,
which are otherwise unattractive because of the risk of not being paid even if the
consumer prevails.1 2 5 Further, more consumers may bring suit if they know
they are likely to recover legal fees. 126 The advantage of the provision for attorneys' fees, and the provision which allows treble damages if a manufacturer unreasonably refuses to comply with the law, 127 is that both sections threaten
128
manufacturers with punitive damages, which are unavailable under the UCC.
The North Carolina lemon law does not contain a statute of limitations. 129
Commentators have criticized other lemon laws because their statutes of limitations are too short. 130 North Carolina courts may adopt the four-year statute of

limitations of the UCC. 131 Adopting the UCC statute of limitations would appear to make sense because "[i]f the claims are not stale under the U.C.C. they
are not likely to be stale under the lemon law." 132 Alternatively, the State may
adopt the three-year statute of limitation under section 1-52(2), which applies to
"a liability created by statute, either state or federal, unless some other time is
1 33
mentioned in the statute creating it."
The North Carolina General Assembly's failure to address the issue of ret-

rospective application raises the question whether the law would protect a consumer who had purchased her car before October 1, 1987, when the law went
into effect, but whose warranty has not yet expired. 134 Such a consumer would
124. Discretionary attorneys' fees are available under CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-180 (West
1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(5)(b) (West Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322E.1(8) (West
1985 & Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. § 367.842(9) (Cum. Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1167 (Supp. 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-159(7) (Cum. Supp. 1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 198-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-24-208 (Supp. 1987); W. VA.
CODE § 46A-6A-4(b)(4) (1986); Wyo. STAT. § 40-17-101G) (Supp. 1987). Mandatory attorneys'
fees are available under COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-12-103(3) (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 407.577(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987); NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-2707 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 357-D:3 (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16A-9 (Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 31-5.2-11
(Supp. 1987). One commentator has suggested that lemon laws should allow recovery of expert
witness fees as well as attorneys' fees. See Vogel, supra note 1, at 662.
125. Kegley & Hiller, supra note 1, at 102; Vogel, supra note 1, at 660-61.
126. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 280.
127. "[The amount fixed by the verdict] shall be trebled upon a finding that the manufacturer
unreasonably refused to comply [with the law]." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.8(2) (1987).
128. Unlike the UCC, the Magnuson-Moss Act does award attorneys' fees. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(d)(2) (1982).
129. Other statutes of limitations range from six months after the warranty expires or 18 months
after delivery, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(5)(a) (West Supp. 1987), to four years, N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAWS § 198-a(j) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
130. Goldberg, supranote 1, at 277 ("It is difficult to understand why a statute which is purportedly designed to increase and expand protections and remedies for the consumer would reduce by
more than half the existing limitations period under the U.C.C."); Vogel, supra note 1, at 664-66.
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-725 (1986).
132. Vogel, supra note I, at 665.
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(2) (1987); see also Clifford, All You Need to Know About the N.C
Lemon Law, N.C. B. Notes 12 (Apr./May 1988) (part two) (section 1-52(2) seems more pertinent
than the UCC statute of limitations in North Carolina).
134. Other states have eliminated this ambiguity by adopting express provisions that limit the
law's applicability. See, ag., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 9.2705(9) (Supp. 1987) (cars sold to original consumer on or after effective date of Act); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.2-1(D) (Supp. 1987) (cars
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most likely be unable to recover under the lemon law because the warrantor
would have had no notice of the law's application when it entered into the contract. At least one Attorney General ruling has stated that lemon laws should
be applied prospectively "to avoid a construction .

.

. which would call into

135
question the constitutionality of [the lemon law]."'
Although the general assembly could have taken greater advantage of the
lemon law to supplement the existing UCC protection by defining ambiguous
terms and omitting provisions that restrict UCC remedies, the lemon law should
prove to be valuable to North Carolina consumers. As a latecomer to the game
of lemon law enactment, North Carolina has learned from other states' mistakes. The statute's broad application will protect consumers of almost any new
motor vehicle sold under warranty, not just purchasers of family automobiles.
Its presumption of "reasonable" number of repair attempts will allow consumers
to seek redress sooner than they could in most other states. Giving the power to
elect a refund to the consumer rather than to the manufacturer increases the
lemon law's effectiveness as consumer legislation. Short statutes of limitations
have emasculated other lemon laws, but North Carolina consumers will have
ample time to discover and document defects before filing a claim. Punitive
damages and a governmental cause of action should allow the North Carolina
law to avoid enforcement diffculties encountered in other jurisdictions. Compared with other lemon laws, North Carolina's should prove to be one of the
most effective.
HEATHER NEWTON

sold or replaced by manufacturer after effective date of this chapter); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4179
(1984) (vehicle beginning with model year following July 1, 1984); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6A-3(a)
(1986) (cars purchased on or after January 1, 1984).
135. Op. Att'y Gen., 83-47 (July 29, 1983) (cited in notes accompanying FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 681.10 -.108 (West Supp. 1987)).

